The banking sector in developing countries is regarded as an engine of economic growth (Arun, 2004) . It is believed that corporate governance is necessary to ensure a sound financial system and, consequently, help develop the country's economy. Using a Pooled Generalised Least Squares (GLS) regression model, the relationship between board structure and bank's performance is analysed. A total of 107 listed banks in nine countries of the Asian emerging markets were included in the study. It is evidenced that only one aspect of board structure, which is CEO Duality, is positively significant, with market-based corporate performance.
Introduction
The banking sector in developing countries is regarded as an engine for economic growth (Arun and Turner, 2004) and, in an underdeveloped financial market, banks are the most important source of finance for the majority of firms as well as being the main depository for the economy's savings. Given the importance of the role of banks to the economy, particularly in the emerging context, it is believed that corporate governance is necessary to ensure a sound financial system and, consequently, help develop the country's economy. This is reflected in the statement of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (here after BCBS), which advocates that corporate governance is necessary to ensure a sound financial system and, consequently, a country's economic development (Andres and Vallelado, 2008) .
The problem of bank governance is largely attributable to the unique context in which banks operate, arising from the complexity, diversity and highly regulated nature that characterises the environment. The many regulations that banks are subject to is a consequence of their dual function, being depositors and lenders, which consequently binds interest in various parties, for example, investors, depositors, credit rating institutions and regulators. This may complicate the banking system itself as this increases the asymmetric information and decreases the chances for stakeholders to monitor (Andres and Vallelado, 2008) . In this complicated environment the role of the banks' boards is significant in ensuring the smooth operation and value added services to the banks. The complexity of the business nature also requires that it not only monitors the managers' efficiency but also gives managers access to independent and valuable advice to operate the banks. This shows that the bank board and managers are part of the governance structure for ensuring good corporate governance. Consistent with the recent sub-prime event, corporate governance practices in financial institutions receive heightened attention from various stakeholders (Ou-Yang, 2008) . Regulators and academics are now looking at the decision-making process of financial institutions in order to enhance accountability and efficiency (Ou-Yang, 2008 ).
This study aims to identify whether any relationship exists between the board monitoring mechanism, which specifically serves to monitor the banking firms, and market-based corporate performance of banking firms in Asian emerging markets. This study contributes to the diverse approaches of the Agency theory in explaining the link between various characteristics of the board and corporate performance. Specifically, this study attempts to examine the role of boards as a mechanism for corporate governance of banks. Boards are becoming an important mechanism to monitor management behaviour, and advice on strategy and planning. They can be an effective mechanism used to reduce agency problems between various parties and managers. They can also help reduce conflict between the regulator and the banks by coping with legal responsibilities. As such, if the mechanism works well it will increase bank performance.
Agency theory is used to hypothesise the relationship between board characteristics (independent variables) and firm performance (dependent variable). In this study, three board characteristics are selected on the basis of the Agency theory argument that it could affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the board. First, this study looks at CEO duality, which the agency theory states as being where the shareholders interests are protected by separating the incumbency of roles of board chair and CEO (Eisenhardt, 1989) ; however, this is against stewardship theory which postulate the opposite (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) . Second is the board size where proponents of the agency theory argue that a greater number of directors is needed to monitor and control a firm's activities and that a larger board is positively associated with firm performance (Dalton et al., 1999) . Lastly, there is Board independence, which refers to the entry of outsiders to the board. The rationale of having independent directors is to reduce agency costs, to gain access to the capital market as well as to ensure accountability in executive remuneration (Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999) .
Using a Pooled Generalised Least Squares (GLS) regression model, the relationship between board structure and bank's performance is analysed. A total of 107 listed banks, which were identified in the nine countries of the Asian emerging markets, were included in the study. The countries are Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and India. This study found that only one aspect of board structure, which is CEO Duality, is significant; however, with a positive relationship with market-based corporate performance. Such findings are contrary to the agency theory. This implies that a company with CEO Duality will be able to better manage the firm where the power for decision making and efficiency in monitoring management can be enhanced. Perhaps this is due to the nature and culture of the emerging market itself.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses corporate governance in Asian emerging markets, followed by a highlight of the issues relating to corporate governance in banking. The discussion of the agency theory and how it links the board characteristics and performance, followed by hypotheses development, is discussed in the theoretical framework. The next section elaborates on the data and methodology followed by the results and discussion. This paper ends with the conclusion and directions for future research.
In the initial stages, corporate governance implementation in Asian countries focused on measures taken as a resolution to the 1997 East Asian crisis such as restructuring, mergers and acquisition exercises as well as government intervention in the private sector. Later, the Codes of Corporate Governance, which recommended various governance elements to ensure their effectiveness in protecting shareholders as well as the stakeholders' interest, were introduced and used as guidelines for corporations in formulating their governance related matters. The codes and their establishment in the Asian emerging markets are presented in Table 1 . It is clearly indicated that all of the codes were released during the post-crisis period, starting as early as 1998. Overall, the post crisis period indicates the foundation of a good governance framework in the region, where each country has its own Code of Corporate Governance that is enforced by the exchanges and securities commission of the respective country. According to Kiel and Nicholson (2003) , a common aim of many of the theories of corporate governance has been to posit a link between various characteristics of the board of directors and corporate performance. It is also consistent with the codes of corporate governance in all countries under this study where characteristics of the board of directors are included as a major aspect of the codes. Based on the codes, a summary of selected corporate governance mechanisms concerning the board structure in the Asian emerging markets is identified and presented in Table 2 . With appropriate reforms being put in place, attention is now focusing on the effectiveness of these reforms in improving performance as well as on the implications of the reforms to improve corporate governance at the national level and the level of the firm, and how it leads to improved corporate performance. Though it is generally agreed that effective corporate governance assures protection on investment and generates return, studies have found differences in corporate governance practices across industries. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that optimal governance may differ across industries. It is already proven that differences in governance are found between manufacturing firms and insurance industry firms (Talmor and Wallace, 2001) , and between manufacturing firms and public utilities firms (Booth et al., 2002) . This study intends to shed some light on the relation of the board structure, as the governance mechanism, and bank performance, particularly in the Asian emerging markets. With the increase in laws and self regulation following the governance reforms it may perhaps produce interesting findings. Earlier studies generally reached a consensus that there are indeed significant differences in corporate governance practices between banking firms and corporations in other economic sectors. The differences are attributed to the complexity, diversity and highly regulated nature of the banking institutions, which warrants a broader view of corporate governance for banks compared to non-financial firms Mehran, 2002, 2003; Levine, 2003; Macey and O'hara, 2003) . Nevertheless, studies on corporate governance and performance relationships have so far focused on non-financial firms e.g., Baliga et al. (1996) , Bhagat and Black (1999) , Demstz and Villalonga (2001), and Abdullah (2004) .
Issues of corporate governance in banking
A bank is classified as an intermediary that pools money from investors/depositors, lends it and monitors it on their behalf. Levine (2003) concluded that there is a heavy reliance on the banking sector as an engine of economic growth for developing economies while Arun and Turner (2004) argued that in an underdeveloped financial market, banks are the most important source of finance for the majority of firms, as well as being the main depository for the economy's savings. It is further argued that the financial intermediaries play various important roles in the economy including monitoring non-financial firms, producing allocative efficiency and in providing inter-temporal smoothing of risks (Emmons and Schmid, 1999) . Given the importance of banks in an economy, a failure in the banking system would directly affect the financial health of the country (Banerjee, 2004) .
There are also other facts concerning the importance of corporate governance for banking firms. Caprio et al. (2003) stated that governance mechanisms would be able to reduce the expropriation of bank resources and promote bank efficiency. Additionally, banking institutions have, in fact, been positively contributing to the performance of companies (Eldomiaty and Choi, 2003) . Banks in Germany, characterised by its 'Universal Banking System', are more heavily involved in financing corporations compared to capital markets; thus, they assume a much larger role of corporate governance due to their position as lenders, share underwriters, major equity holders, stock exchange market makers, holders of corporate board positions and exercising proxy votes held by small shareholders (Lowengrub et al., 2003) . Therefore, as major creditors to the corporations and, in some countries, as major equity holders, banks play a role in influencing the corporate governance of firms (Caprio et al., 2003) . Chirinko et al. (1999) argued that in a situation of large creditorship, where firms rely on credit from financial institutions, banks are able to play a governance role by monitoring a firm's activities, demand audits and impose penalty payments. As such, sound governance of a bank increases the likelihood that the bank will exert sound governance over the firms they fund.
Theoretical framework

Theory of board of directors: agency theory
According to Kiel and Nicholson (2003) , a common aim of many of the theories of corporate governance has been to posit a link between various characteristics of the board and corporate performance. There are different perspectives on the way boards of directors influence corporate financial performance, originating from diverse disciplines such as economics, finance, management, sociology, politics and law. The basis for research on corporate governance from the perspective of finance and economics comes from the agency theory. It is the most recognised approach in research on the contribution of the boards (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989) . The separation of ownership and control creates a conflict of interest between owners (principal) and controllers (agents). It was formalised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) for the modern corporation. They defined agency relationship as: "a contract under which one or more persons [the principal(s)] engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent."
According to Zahra and Pearce II (1989) the agency theory perspective on the board of directors is directed at maximising shareholders wealth, which is the ultimate goal of the firm. The primary role of the board is to monitor the actions of agents (managers) to ensure their efficiency and to protect principals' shareholders interest.
The loss incurred by the shareholders as a result of management behaviour, which deviates from the maximisation of shareholder wealth, plus the cost of mechanisms employed to control such behaviour, is known as agency costs. On the other hand, Brigham and Daves (2004) define agency costs as all costs borne by the shareholders to encourage managers to maximise the firm's long-term stock price rather than act in their own self-interests. The theory asserts that firms can employ various mechanisms to align the interests of the agents and principals and to monitor the behaviour of the agents.
Board as a monitoring mechanism
Shareholders who are owners of companies elect a board of directors to monitor the running of the company. The board of directors is designated for the purpose of ensuring the alignment of a firm's activities and its specified objectives. The board has the duty to make sure that top managers behave in a way that will provide optimal value for shareholders (Coles et al., 2001) . Keenan (2004) highlighted three major duties of boards, which deal with developing the business strategy; appointment of senior management; and ensuring the availability of information, control and audit systems for observing company performance and making decisions. From another perspective, Sussland (2005) viewed the board of directors as a referee and a coach. As a referee, they approve or disapprove major decisions and the final reports by applying the prescribing rules. As a coach, they must sufficiently get involved with top management and be proactive to take appropriate measures when problems arise. According to Jensen (1983) , there are at least three characteristics used to explain the board structure of a firm, which are CEO duality, board size and board independence.
The problem of bank governance does not differ much from other organisations. However, it is unique in the context in which banks operate due to the complexity, diversity and highly regulated nature that characterises the environment. As such, there is much for bank boards to cope with and oversee as compared with other industries. In the complicated environment, the role of bank board is significant in ensuring smooth operation and the value added to the bank. The complexity of the business nature also requires that it not only monitors the managers' efficiency but also gives managers access to independent and valuable advice to operate the banks.
CEO duality
The leadership structure of a firm can be divided into combined leadership structure and separated structure (Coles et al., 2001 ). This has something to do with the position of the chairman of the board and the manager (the CEO in the American setting or the Managing Director in British style organisations). From one perspective, efficiency in monitoring management can be enhanced through CEO-Chairman duality, where a single person assumes the position of Chairman and CEO simultaneously. It is because less contracting is needed and information asymmetry is reduced when a person assumes both positions in a corporation (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) . However, the primary feature of the agency theory requires that the shareholders' interests are protected by separating the incumbency of roles of board chair and CEO (Eisenhardt, 1989) . The argument being that the CEO, who is also a board chair, will have a concentrated power base that will allow him or her to make decisions in his or her own-self interest and at the expense of shareholders. Jensen (1983) maintained that the combined structure is an inappropriate way to design one of the most critical power relationships in a firm.
Evidence on the relationship between CEO duality and firm value is mixed. In a study involving 348 Australian public listed firms, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) reported a negative relationship between CEO duality and Tobin's Q after controlling for firm size. Another study by Brickley et al. (1994) , also found that CEO duality enhances performance and firm value. However, other studies highlight that firms where the positions of the CEO and Chairman of the BOD are split, produce greater performance and greater value.
This study supports the use of a separate leadership structure, where the titles are separated into two positions held by two separate individuals with power spreading in a way that allows the board to completely perform its fiduciary duties. We believe that CEO duality in the banking industry may weaken the independence of the monitoring role of the CEO who is involved in decision making. Thus, our first hypothesis is stated as follows:
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and the corporate performance of listed banking firms in Asian emerging markets.
Board size
There are conflicting ideas concerning the appropriate size of a board of directors for both financial and non-financial firms. In terms of figures, Vafeas (1999) documented a board size of 12 while Xie et al. (2003) recorded a mean of 12.48. Jensen (1983) suggested that having a small board can help improve performance as the board is less likely to function effectively when it gets beyond seven or eight people. It is further argued that any increase in board size will make it less effective in monitoring management because of free-riding problems among directors as well as increased decision-making time.
There are many studies that conclude an inverse relationship between board size and performance. Yermack (1996) reported a negative correlation between board size and Tobin's Q and other accounting measures of profitability. Meanwhile, a study by Eisenberg et al. (1998) on Finnish firms identified the same correlation but using different performance measures i.e., operating performance, the return on assets and operating margin. Consistent with Yermack and Eisenberg, Mak and Kusnadi (2002) found that there is an inverse relationship between board size and Tobin's Q in Malaysia and Singapore. Combining the firms from the two countries in a pooled regression also generates the same results. However, Dalton et al. (1999) , in a meta analysis of 131 samples, discovered a positive relationship between board size and performance. Following the majority of studies in non-financial firms, Cornett et al (2003) found that the number of board members is negatively and significantly related to an abnormal return in a bidding bank involving diversifying acquisitions.
Proponents of the agency theory argue that a greater number of directors is needed to monitor and control a firm's activities where a larger board is positively associated with firm performance (Dalton et al., 1999) . There are studies that support the idea that having a large sized board will have a positive influence on firm performance (Zahra and Pearce II, 1989; Smith and Watts, 1992) . It is evidenced that a larger board is needed in the banking industry due to the regional expansion of banking activities Mehran, 2002, 2004) . Adams and Mehran's (2005) findings, which were specifically conducted in the banking industry, also found a positive relationship between board size and performance. Perhaps, in the banking industry, where it is more complex and diverse, having more board members will help facilitate the supervision and provide better monitoring (Andres and Vallelado, 2008) . More people will also add more human capital for advisory purposes. It is better to have additional directors who are endowed with the knowledge, incentives and abilities, which are required to monitor, discipline and advise managers. Based on this finding, our second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Board independence
Board independence refers to the entry of outsiders onto the board to safeguard the operation of the board by acting as 'professional referees' (Fama and Jensen, 1983 ). An increase in the proportion of outside directors on the board should increase firm performance as it may provide more effective monitoring of managers (Adams and Mehran, 2003) . The rationale of having independent directors is to reduce agency costs, to gain access to the capital market as well as to ensure accountability in executive remuneration (Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999) . The agency theory supports a higher proportion of outside directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Muth and Donaldson, 1998) . Dalton et al. (1999) stated that a major prescription of the agency theory is that effective boards will largely consist of independent outside directors. Brennan and McDermott (2004) argued that independent directors are more effective in monitoring managers, thereby reducing the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control. Petra (2005) argued that independent directors may play a role in controlling management in aspects such as takeover threats, CEO compensation and nominations of directors. Cornett et al. (2003) , in a study on intrastate bank acquisitions, also found that a greater proportion of outsiders on the board led to greater acquiring bank returns. Meanwhile, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (1994) studied the announcement impact of governance rules in the USA in response to the 2001-2002 corporate scandals. The rules require firms to have a majority of independent directors, an independent audit committee, independent nominating committee and an independent compensation committee. They found that large firms which changed their governance structure to comply with the rules enjoyed significantly higher returns, varying between 14% and 23% in the year the rules were announced. Mehran (2002, 2003) conducted a study on the banking sector and found no significant relationship between the proportion of outsiders on the board and firm performance based on Tobin's Q, although they found some evidence of a positive correlation between Tobin's Q and a majority-outside board. Andres and Vallelado (2008) supported the suggestion that it is advisable to appoint outside directors. This could help lessen the conflict of interests among stakeholders and fulfil the function of monitoring and advising the managers. Based on this justification our third hypothesis is formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between Board Independence and the corporate performance of listed banking firms in Asian emerging markets.
The whole discussions and arguments are summarised in Figure 1 . 
Data and methodology
A total of 157 listed banks were identified in the nine countries of the Asian emerging markets but only 107 were included in the study due to the other 50 lacking data completeness. This represents 68.15% of listed banks in the selected Asian emerging markets. This study involves cross-sectional data sets of emerging markets consisting of nine countries; and a different number of banking firms in each cross-section or cluster ranging from 3 to 21 observations. The countries are Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and India.
This study assumes a direct relationship between board structure (independent variables) and market-based performance of banking firms (dependent variable). In addition, control variables were also included to account for the firm level differences among the listed banks in the Asian emerging markets. This study adopts capital adequacy ratio and size of the firm as control variables. It is important to include this variable to account for the firm-level difference that contributes to performance. Size is the proxy for the banking firm's total assets. The use of total assets as a control variable is consistent with other studies such as Kiel and Nicholson (2003) , and Krishnamurthi et al. (2003) .
The banking industry often requires a careful analysis of its risk management function due to its high leverage and high-risk characteristics. Berger et al. (1995) , and Saidenberg and Schuermann (2003) argued that capital regulation, particularly in banks, protects consumers and depositors and reduces systemic risk. Meanwhile, Gersbach and Wenzelburger (2003) stressed that capital adequacy serves as an indicator of the banking system and suggested a strict enforcement of capital adequacy rules as one of the policy measures in a banking crisis. The purpose of having a minimum capital adequacy ratio is to ensure that banks can absorb a reasonable level of loss before becoming insolvent and before depositors' funds are lost. The Basel Capital Accord sets minimum capital ratios of not less than 8%, which the supervisory authorities are encouraged to apply. Lindquist (2004) posited that as other forms of regulation disappear, and with the experience from the banking crises, capital adequacy regulations become relatively more important. Das and Saibal Ghosh (2006) argued that well-capitalised banks are perceived to be relatively safe which, in turn, lowers their cost of borrowing and, consequently, is efficiency enhancing. Regarding profitability, empirical results from Lin et al. (2005) indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between capital adequacy and various financial performance i.e., Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Profit Margin and Earnings before Income Tax. Based on those arguments, the capital adequacy ratio is also treated as a control variable in this study. The definitions of each variable are summarised in Table 3. Using a Pooled (GLS) regression model, the relationship between board structure and bank's performance is analysed based on the following equations: Random error
Parameters to be estimated.
Pooled GLS regression is chosen with the assumption of the presence of heteroscedasticity. This is consistent with Wooldridge's (2003) argument that GLS is used to take into account the problem of heteroscedasticity in the errors. In effect, errors are allowed to be correlated or to have unequal variance or there is 'unequal spread' between cross-sections. This is also consistent with the view of Lutz and Lutz (2004) who suggested that GLS estimation is quite appropriate when the pattern of heteroscedasticity is unknown. Additionally, 'fixed effects' are used to account for the 'individuality' of each company or each cross-sectional unit. According to Wooldridge (2003) , 'fixed effects' methods are used for cluster samples. Such an assumption is made because the sample comprises banking firms from different countries, which are different from one another. This is also supported by Gujarati (2003) who stated that the differences may be due to the unique features of each country. 
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Tables 4 and 5 . Similar to the non-financial firms, the banking firms in the Asian emerging markets are inclined towards having Separated Leadership (85 banks or 79.44%) rather than Combined Leadership (22 banks or 20.56%). In terms of the other board structure mechanisms, the average board size and board independence are 10.39 persons and 32.29%, respectively. This is lower than the average board size reported in the studies in the USA by Vafeas (1999) , Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) , Xie et al. (2003) and Altinkilic et al. (2005) , which ranged from 11 to 18 board members. However, it is greater than the recommended size proposed by Jensen (1983) who recommended an optimal board size of 7 to 8 directors. However, the finding is not much different from the results reported in another banking study conducted by Adams and Mehran (2002) . On average, listed banking firms in Asian emerging markets have a board independence rate of 32.29%. This is quite low compared to the evidence from other studies e.g., 55.6% in Vafeas (1999) , 46% in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) , 69% in Adams and Mehran (2002) and 50.8% in Altinkilic et al. (2005) . Even though it is considered low, the rate should be acceptable as banking institutions in Asia are left behind in terms of good corporate governance practices compared to their counterparts in more advanced economies. After experiencing the financial crisis in 1997 they are now starting to appreciate the importance of good governance mechanisms, which mirror those of the USA and other countries. As such, they are at an early stage of imposing the rule of board independence. With better understanding and the potential benefits of having an independent board, banking firms in Asia are expected to increase the number of such board members in the future. In terms of size, banking firms in Singapore, Korea and Hong Kong are categorised as the largest banks, with a mean asset value of more than US$ 25,000 million. Their mean values are greater than the overall means of US$ 16,974.96 million. It is interesting to note that Singaporean banks have the highest mean value even though there are only three listed banks in the country, which, compared with India, with 18 banks in the sample, has a mean value of total assets just slightly below the overall mean. The Philippines and Indonesia are in the lowest category with mean asset values of less than US$ 5000 million.
In terms of capital adequacy, all countries displayed means above the 8% requirement, with the Philippine banking firms leading the league at 22.28%. This is above the mean of all the countries, which is 15.68%. The lowest rate is indicated by the Korean banks with 10.68%. Other than the Philippines; Indonesia, Singapore and Hong Kong have an average capital adequacy above 15.68%.
In terms of market-based performance, except for the Philippines, all of the countries have a Tobin's Q above 1.00. Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Hong Kong recorded higher than the mean Tobin's Q of all the countries, which was 1.03. Listed banks in the Philippines and Hong Kong exhibit the lowest and highest Tobin's Q, with means of 0.99 and 1.08, respectively.
Pooled GLS regression
The result of the regression analysis is presented in Table 6 . The R 2 in all models is found to be very consistent both with and without the inclusion of the control variables. This indicates that the consequence of corporate governance is captured by the market value of the firm. Table 6 Regression result using Tobin's Q as the dependent variable The regression analysis reveals that combining the positions of the CEO and the Chairperson of the board positively affects banking firm performance only when capital adequacy and total assets are included in the model. This is contrary to hypothesis number one. The finding is consistent with the earlier studies of Boyd (1995) , Coles et al. (2001) and Weir et al. (2003) . Therefore, hypothesis one is rejected. This is also against what is advocated by the agency theory proponents. In conclusion, a leadership structure, with combined roles of CEO and Chairman, is best accepted in the banking business of Asian emerging markets. Board independence is found to have a non-significant relationship with Tobin's Q in all model specifications. The non-relationship between board independence and performance is also consistent with other studies e.g., Yermack (1996) , Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) , Bhagat and Black (1999) and Mehran (2002, 2004) . The results verified that independent directors do not appear to strengthen the corporate board of banking firms. It seems that their presence does not contribute to the role of monitoring and controlling the management of the banking firms or protecting the shareholders interests; however, it has to be understood that the practice of good corporate governance, including board independence, is still at the infancy stage and the whole impact is yet to be seen.
Independent variable
The implications of the regression results are that board size has the same relationship with board independence as firm value. The non-relationship between board size and firm value differs from the studies of non-financial firms, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) , where board size has a negative relationship with performance, and financial firms, e.g., Adam and Mehran (2002) , where it provides an opposite direction. Such results may lead to the conclusion that increases or decreases in board size do not make them more effective in monitoring the management of the banking firms.
Conclusion and directions for future research
The objective of this paper is to identify the relationship between board structure monitoring mechanisms and the firm value of listed banks in Asian emerging markets. With most of the biggest banks located in Singapore, Korea and Hong Kong, we found that only one aspect of board structure, which is CEO duality, displays a significant positive relationship with market-based corporate performance. This is contrary to what we expected, as well as to what is advocated by the agency theory, which argues that shareholders are better protected with a separate role. This is not evident in this study. As such, it is concluded that CEO duality is beneficial to corporate performance in both non-banking (as evident in previous studies Brickley et al., 1994) and banking firms. This finding adds to the inclusive conclusion of the role of CEO duality in terms of corporate performance. This can be justified -as a company with CEO duality will be able to better manage firms where the power for decision making and efficiency in monitoring management can be enhanced, which is perhaps attributable to the nature and culture of emerging markets.
It is quite surprising that findings in relation to board size, number of independent directors and firm performance are not consistent with previous studies conducted in the banking industry. We expected the result to be consistent with Adams and Mehran (2005) and Andres and Vallelado (2008) , where both variables have a positive influence on firm performance. Both studies were conducted in developed countries (Adams and Mehran, 2005; Andres and Vallelado, 2008) and this study used samples from emerging countries. Perhaps this is the reason for the inconsistency. The institutional factors, regulations and laws in the emerging markets create a different environment from that of the other studies. Perhaps the increase in regulations and laws causes the governance mechanism to be ineffective. Thus, this study contributes by providing evidence that the board structure is no longer a relevant governance mechanism in the Asian emerging markets.
In terms of theoretical explanation, the agency theory does not receive any support from this study. Although such findings imply that further examination needs to be done in order to understand why, it is not the purpose of this study to testify to the irrelevance of the agency theory in explaining the governance structure of banking firms, particularly as previous studies (Adams and Mehran, 2005; Andres and Vallelado, 2008) show different results. However such phenomena provide sufficient reason for other theories to be explored and used in explaining corporate governance.
In terms of its limitations, the study is hampered by data completeness. The researcher only managed to collect a full set of data for 107 banks or the equivalent of 68.15%. Data on the rest of the banks are either incomplete or, the annual report, which is the main source for corporate governance information, is not available. The implication of having an inadequate number of observations is reflected by the limited diagnostic tests in the regression. Furthermore, the study ignores the accounting standards adopted in different countries. However, this is consistent with other studies on Asian firms such as Mitton (2002) and Fan and Wong (2001) . In effect, the calculations of corporate performance measures are based on unstandardised accounting information.
This study was also conducted based on the direct relationship observation, which ignores the influence of some of the significant moderating or mediating variables. However, although this is a limitation, this study was only intended to be a preliminary study for future studies that may incorporate moderating and mediating variables in order to make them more robust. There are also other recommendations that can be made for future research. In acknowledging the limitations of the data in this study, the first and foremost recommendation is to propose that a larger pool of observations is used in future studies so that performance and monitoring mechanisms relationship can be evaluated over a large number of observations using the panel data approach. Having a longer period can also be associated with the future benefits of the ongoing bank reforms, of which the importance of corporate governance is better appreciated and understood, and, thus, appropriately adopted by the banking firms. Future studies on board structure may further investigate the other characteristics of the board of directors and factors that may contribute to corporate performance. In addition, it may treat Board Independence at varying levels of independence, such as -majority, super majority or other formats that may have a relationship with the corporate performance of the banking firms. It is also important to define and resolve the issue of the level of independence of the board.
